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Abstract
The goal of an accident investigation is to determine why a certain combination of conditions, events, 
and actions led to the specific outcome. Accidents in complex high risk operations, such as aviation, 
are frequently explained as the result of system failures, but few methods exist that can adequately be 
used to investigate how the variability of  individual,  technical,  and organisational  performance  in 
combination may lead to an adverse outcome. The Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) 
provides  an approach to  identify these elements  and determine  their  interrelationship.  This  paper 
presents  the  principles  of  FRAM  and  illustrates  how it  was  used  to  analyse  a  highly publicized 
aviation accident, the crash of Comair Airlines (Delta Connection) flight 5191 in Lexington, KY on 
August 27th, 2006. The use of FRAM provided details that were not found in the NTSB analysis and 
as such this approach model may help future investigations better elucidate causal factors and yield 
improved safety recommendations. 
Introduction
The goal of any accident investigation is to determine why a certain combination of conditions, events, 
and actions led to the specific outcome. There are normally few problems determining what happened, 
since in most industrial domains the consequences are manifest. (The situation may not be the same 
for “accidents” in other fields of endeavour, for instance financial markets.) But the explanation of 
why something happened may be less obvious. In order to construct an explanation it is necessary to 
have a methodical approach, which in turn requires an articulated accident model or accident theory, 
i.e.,  a  formal  or  semi-formal  description  of  how accidents  occur,  often  in  terms  of  cause-effect 
relations. 
Since the systematic concern for industrial accidents began about 100 years ago, practitioners and 
researchers have developed several different accident models and methods to help them in accident 
investigation. Such models and methods are usually adequate for the typical problems of their time; 
indeed,  there  would  be  little  reason  to  develop  models  and methods  that  were  more  complex  or 
powerful than needed. Yet because socio-technical systems continue to develop and thereby become 
more complex and more tightly coupled, all models and methods will eventually become outdated and 
underpowered.
Models have over time gone from simple linear models, such as the domino model (Heinrich, 1931), 
via complex linear or epidemiological models, such as the Swiss cheese model (Reason, 1990), to 
systemic models (e.g., Leveson, 2004). Despite their differences, they all adhere to the principle that 
accidents are caused and that the causes can be understood as failures or malfunctions of technology, 
humans or organizations – either alone or together. It has only recently become accepted that accidents 
can be the outcome of unexpected combinations of normal performance variability,  i.e., arise from 
normal  actions.  This  view recognizes  that  normal  actions  never  can  be  completely prescribed  or 
regulated because working conditions always are underspecified. Short and longer term adjustments 
are therefore needed to match specific situations or conditions. This variability is not just normal and 
useful, but indeed necessary for work to be done. On the individual level the adjustments have been 
described  as  sacrificing  decisions  or  efficiency-thoroughness  trade-offs  (Hollnagel,  2004).  On  the 
collective  or  organisational  level,  the  adjustments  have  been  described  using  terms  as  drift  or 
migration  (Cook  &  Rasmussen,  2005).  Since  the  variability  normally  is  useful  it  mostly  goes 
unnoticed, regardless of the level at which it takes place. It is only when the variability gives rise to 
unexpected outcomes that it is noticed and deemed to be bad and a cause of failures. 
Although many different accident models exist, the accident investigation community has yet to adopt 
one that is able to explain how the fundamental interrelationships among system functions may lead to 
adverse  outcomes.  This  is  nevertheless  important  if  we  are  ever  to  change  from a  reactive  to  a 
proactive safety management. The Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) and the associated 
method provide a way to examine individual system functions and determine their interrelationship. 
This paper reports the application of the FRAM to analyse a highly publicized aviation accident, the 
crash of Comair flight 5191 in Lexington, KY on August 27th, 2006. The goal of this application was 
to see what relationships the use of FRAM would discover as compared to how the investigation was 
performed in the traditional sense. 
Comair flight 5191
At 0606 hours the morning of August 27th, 2006, Comair flight 5191 a Canadair 50 seat Regional Jet 
(CRJ) crashed after an attempted takeoff from the Lexington Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, KY. 
The flight  was a  14 CFR Part  121 passenger  revenue flight  from Lexington (KLEX) to  Atlanta, 
Georgia (KATL). The aircraft taxied out uneventfully and then inadvertently proceeded to depart from 
the shorter general aviation runway (runway 26) as opposed to the longer air carrier runway (runway 
22). The aircraft became momentarily airborne after it struck an earthen berm, then collided with trees, 
and crashed. There was a significant post-crash fire consuming most of the aircraft, and 49 of the 50 
passengers and crew perished. Figure 1 shows an aerial view of the Lexington Blue Grass Airport with 
an overlay of the aircraft’s actual taxi route, the intended taxi route and the former taxi route prior to 
airport construction. 
The NTSB investigation of the accident concluded that:
... the probable cause of this accident was the flight crewmembers’ failure to use available cues and 
aids to identify the airplane’s location on the airport surface during taxi and their failure to cross-
check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. Contributing to the 
accident were the flight crew’s nonpertinent conversation during taxi, which resulted in a loss of 
positional awareness, and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) failure to require that all 
runway crossings be authorized only by specific air traffic control (ATC) clearances.
The accident was explained as being caused mainly by the failures of the humans at the sharp end, 
with some blame also going to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The remainder of this 
paper will illustrate how a FRAM analysis can produce a more nuanced – and therefore hopefully also 
a more adequate – explanation. 
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Figure 1: Comair flight 5191: Actual, intended, and former taxi paths.
Overview of the Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM)
The Functional Resonance Accident Model and the associated method provide a way to describe how 
multiple  functions and conditions can combine to produce an adverse outcome (Hollnagel,  2004). 
FRAM is based on the following principles:
• The principle of equivalence of successes and failures. FRAM adheres to the resilience engineering 
view that failures represent the flip side of the adaptations necessary to cope with the real world 
complexity rather than a failure of normal system functions. Success depends on the ability of 
organisations, groups and individuals to anticipate risks and critical situations, to recognise them in 
time, and to take appropriate action; failure is due to the temporary or permanent absence of that 
ability.
• The principle of approximate adjustments. Since the conditions of work never completely match 
what  has  been  specified  or  prescribed,  individuals  and  organisations  must  always  adjust  their 
performance so that it can succeed under the existing conditions, specifically the actual resources 
and requirements. Because resources (time, manpower, information, etc.) always are finite, such 
adjustments are invariably approximate rather than exact. 
• The principle of emergence. The variability of normal performance is rarely large enough to be the 
cause of an accident in itself or even to constitute a malfunction. But the variability from multiple 
functions may combine in unexpected ways,  leading to consequences that are disproportionally 
large, hence produce a non-linear effect. Both failures and normal performance are emergent rather 
than resultant phenomena, because neither can be attributed to or explained only by referring to the 
(mal)functions of specific components or parts. 
• The principle of functional resonance. The variability of a number of functions may every now and 
then resonate, i.e., reinforce each other and thereby cause the variability of one function to exceed 
normal limits. The consequences may spread through tight couplings rather than via identifiable 
and enumerable cause-effect links, e.g., as described by the Small World Phenomenon. This can be 
described as a resonance of the normal variability of functions, hence as functional resonance. The 
resonance analogy emphasises  that  this  is  a  dynamic  phenomenon,  hence not  attributable  to  a 
simple combination of causal links.
FRAM Functions and Aspects
In the context of an accident investigation using FRAM, the explanation is produced by proceeding 
through the following steps.
1. Identify essential system functions, using normal or accident-free performance as a baseline. This 
step characterises each function separately but does not try to arrange or order them in any way. The 
starting point may be existing task analyses, procedures, expert knowledge, etc. The characterisation 
uses the following six aspects: 
• Input (I): that which the function processes or transforms or that which starts the function,
• Output (O): that which is the result of the function, either an entity or a state change, 
• Preconditions (P): conditions that must be exist before a function can be executed,
• Resources (R): that which the function needs or consumes to produce the output,
• Time (T): temporal constraints affecting the function (with regard to starting time, finishing time, 
or duration), and 
• Control (C): how the function is monitored or controlled.
Each function may be described by a simple table, which then can be used for the further analysis. It is 
also possible to show the functions graphically using a hexagon to represent each function (FRAM 
modules, Figure 2). 
Characterise  the  observed  variability  of  system  functions,  considering  both  actual  and  potential 
variability.  The  purpose  of  FRAM  is  to  provide  an  explanation  of  the  accident  in  terms  of 
combinations of performance variabilities. The second step is therefore for each function to describe 
the actual variability during the accident. This may point to other functions that must be characterised 
as part of the explanation. For instance, if the input to a function came too late, or was of the wrong 
kind, then the source of that input – i.e., another function – must be described and characterised. This 
may in turn require yet other functions to be described, until the total scenario has been accounted for.
3. Identify and describe the functional resonance from the observed dependencies / couplings among 
functions and the observed performance variability. The output of the first and the second steps is a list 
of functions each characterised by two or more of the six aspects. (Notice that a function may require 
several instances of an aspect to be described.) The dependencies among functions can be found by 
matching or linking their aspects. For example, the output of one function may be the input to another 
function, constitute a resource, fulfil a pre-condition, or enforce a control or time constraint. The result 
is an overall description of how the functions were linked or coupled in the accident scenario, and 
therefore of how functional variability propagated through the system. In general, the links specify 
where the variability of  one function may have an impact,  or  how it  may propagate.  Many such 
occurrences and propagations of variability may create a resonance effect: although the variability of 
each  function may be  below the  normal  detection  threshold,  they may in  combination become  a 
‘signal’, hence constitute a risk.
Figure 2: A FRAM module describing an activity or function in terms of six aspects.
This step may be supported by a visualisation of how the functions are linked. The visualisation can be 
valuable  in  tracing functional  dependencies,  but  the analysis  should nevertheless  be based on the 
description of the functions rather than on the graphical representation. 
4. Identify barriers for variability (damping factors) and specify required performance monitoring. 
Barriers  are  means  to  prevent  an  unwanted  event  from  taking  place,  or  to  protect  against  the 
consequences of an unwanted event (Hollnagel, 2004). Barriers can be described in terms of barrier 
systems (the organizational and/or physical structure of the barrier) and barrier functions (the manner 
by which the barrier achieves its purpose). The four fundamental barrier systems are: (1) physical 
barrier  systems  that  block  the  movement  or  transportation  of  mass,  energy,  or  information;  (2) 
functional barrier systems that set up pre-conditions that must be met before an action (by human and/
or machine) can be undertaken; (3) symbolic barrier systems that are indications of constraints on 
action that are physically present; and (4) incorporeal barrier systems that are indications of constraints 
on action that are not physically present. 
Besides recommendations for barriers, a FRAM analysis can provide the basis for recommendations 
on how to monitor performance in order to detect excessive variability. Performance indicators may be 
developed both for functions and for the couplings between them. 
FRAM analysis
The first step of the FRAM accident analysis is to describe the functions that make up the normal 
departure routine. For a typical civilian flight some of these may include: 
• Review of weather and airport data, 
• Taxi briefing, 
• Takeoff briefing, 
• Clearance(s) from ATC, 
• Perform a taxi checklist, 
• Taxi to runway, 
• Perform a before takeoff checklist, 
• Turn onto the runway, 
• Takeoff.
The functions should include all those needed to begin the analysis. It is, however, not necessary to 
begin with a complete list. The analysis may identify further functions to be included, and since the 
functions are not ordered, e.g., in a sequence or a hierarchy, functions can easily be added or removed 
at a later time. 
To illustrate the principle, consider the function Review of weather and airport data. 
All US air carrier flights are operated under regulations which require that a certified dispatcher 
and the captain assume joint responsibility for all pre-flight planning and preparation. Typically, 
a certified dispatcher will prepare and include all relevant flight information in the form of a 
flight release document for the crew to review. Additional information usually includes any 
applicable Notice to Airmen (NOTAMs) which describe changes at the departure and arrival 
airports or any navigational sources to be used during the flight that have not yet been included 
in charts or other sources of information. The investigation found no evidence that captain did 
not review this material.
The FRAM analysis normally continues by describing the other functions in the same way. Here we 
will, however, proceed to look at whether there was any variability in the way that the  Review of  
weather and airport data was carried out in the accident.
One NOTAM describing a portion of a taxiway closed due to construction (taxiway Alpha 
North  of  runway 26)  was  missing  from the  flight  release.  This  section  of  taxiway was  an 
important consideration because it changed the taxi route that the pilots were accustomed to. 
An additional source of NOTAM information regarding taxiway closures was the pre-recorded 
Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS). This recorded message by air traffic control 
contains current weather, runways in use and any relevant NOTAMs for the airport. Pilots listen 
to this broadcast on a specific radio frequency. The NOTAM regarding the taxiway closure was 
not  included  in  the  ATIS  broadcast  on  the  morning  of  the  accident  as  required.  The 
investigation was unable to determine why the controller omitted this information from that 
specific recording.  
Even this initial description of Review of weather and airport data makes clear that it depends on at 
least three other functions, and that at least two of these have a common source of information, cf. 
Figure 3. The analysis may be continued by looking at the other aspects of the function node, e.g., 
preconditions or  resources,  to get  a better  understanding of how the performance of this  function 
depends on the work situation. 
The accident investigation must obviously try to describe all relevant functions on a level of detail that 
makes it possible to explain the performance variability. For the purpose of illustration, it is reasonable 
Figure 3: FRAM diagram for Review of weather and airport data function.
to focus on one function, Taxi to runway, to understand the factors and conditions that resulted in the 
aircraft being on runway 26 instead of runway 22.
At  06:02  the  first  officer  calls  Lexington  ground  to  request  taxi  clearance  to  the  runway; 
seconds later ground control clears the flight to “… taxi to runway two two altimeter three zero 
zero zero and the winds two zero zero at eight.” As part of this clearance, the controller is 
required to give the pertinent information from the new ATIS or require the flight crew to listen 
to the ATIS broadcast. The controller, however, did not realise that one NOTAM was missing, 
nor that it had been omitted from the ATIS. 
After the taxi checklist was completed the captain stated “finish it up your leisure.” This set a 
relaxed tone for the first officer to go through the before-takeoff checklist as he desired. Since 
this was the first flight of the day, there are several other items on the checklist, which therefore 
takes a little longer and requires the first officer to work “heads down” much of the time. Right 
after  this  there  is  about  40 seconds of  social  conversation,  which the NTSB referred to  as 
“nonpertinent conversation.” This conversation took place where taxiway Alpha made several 
turns. 
The above strongly suggests that  Taxi  to  runway should not  be described as one function but  as 
several.  But  even a description on an aggregate level  shows that  Taxi  to runway is  rather tightly 
coupled to several other functions. Figure 4 provides an illustration of that.
Going into a little more detail, Figure 5 is an excerpt from the surface chart the crew had available. It 
is significant to note that taxiway designation “A4” on the chart was marked on the airport surface 
with a sign that read “A6”. This alone would make it difficult for the crew to detect any discrepancy 
between where they thought were and where they actually were.
Figure 5: Lexington Jeppesen Chart. (Not for navigational use)
Figure 4: Taxi to runway
The before-takeoff checklist consists of 13 items only one of which is a challenge and response. The 
rest are action items for the first officer which must be verbally read when complete. This serves as a 
method to verify that all items were in fact accomplished. One item is the pre-takeoff announcement, 
where the first officer talked to the passengers over the intercom system. This took about 10 seconds 
to complete and occurred at the hold-short line for runway 26. Once this item had been completed, the 
first officer continued to finish the before takeoff checklist. 
During the entire taxi to this point, the first officer was extremely busy with his required duties. When 
they arrived at the hold-short sign for runway 26, he apparently assumed that the captain had delivered 
them to the correct runway. The first officer was unable to see the red runway 26 sign to the left of the 
aircraft from his position in the cockpit’s right seat. The height of the flight deck above the runway 
sign made it impossible for the first officer to see it once they were stopped at the hold short line 
impossible. At 06:05, the crew called ready for takeoff.
These aspects of ATC information and clearances can be seen as variability in the preconditions of the 
Taxi  to  runway function,  incomplete  charts  as  variability  in  resources,  and  the  “nonpertinent  
conversation” as variability affecting controls of this function. The variability in visibility of taxiway 
markings,  signs,  and  lighting  affects  the  resources  used  in  Turn onto runway.  Another  important 
source of variability was that only a single controller was performing all ATC tasks at Lexington at the 
time, affecting the time available for  ATC functions. Lastly, obviously the preconditions of  takeoff  
availability  of  sufficient  length  of  unobstructed  runway were  not  met,  resulting  in  the  output  of 
achieving  V1,  rotation  and  climb  out  being  unsuccessful.  By making  a  similar  analysis  of  other 
functions,  a  view gradually emerges  of  why the  accident  happened.  Due to  the  size  of  the  final 
analysis, it cannot be presented here, but Figure 6 illustrates the complexity of the situation and the 
level of detail that is needed to understand why the accident happened.
Figure 6: Important functions and couplings in the Lexington accident.
Summary and Conclusions
Although  it  is  impossible  to  go  through  the  complete  analysis  in  this  paper,  the  two  functions 
described  above  illustrate  how  the  FRAM  method  step-by-step  builds  up  an  explanation  of  the 
accident. Previous experience with FRAM has shown that it is often convenient to provide a graphical 
rendering of the analysis, such as shown in Figure 6. A simple software tool is available for this visual 
representation directly from the descriptions of the functions. It is, however, important to keep in mind 
that the substance of the analysis resides in the description and characterisation of the functions, and 
not in the resulting images.
The summary makes clear  that  the conclusions of the NTSB fall  somewhat short  of the mark by 
pointing to the failures of the flightcrew as the primary cause of the accident. As Figures 3, 4, and 6 
demonstrate,  the  explanation  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  sequence  of  failures  or  mistakes,  but  must 
consider the situation and the conditions at the time as a whole, the lack of information, etc. The 
explanation  is  important  for  Step  4  of  the  investigation  where  appropriate  countermeasures  are 
developed, specifically how performance variability can be observed and dampened when needed. If 
the explanation is that the flightcrew did not follow procedures, then the obvious recommendation is to 
strengthen procedure compliance. In the case of this accident, the NTSB recommendations consist 
mainly of constraining performance to ensure procedure compliance and of improving information 
presentation in the cockpit as well as outside. The alternative, to manage performance and to control 
the sources of performance variability, is not considered. 
As a method, FRAM has a clear theoretical grounding and is easy to learn and use. Since FRAM does 
not produce a simple sequential description, the administration of the analysis and of the findings can 
be time consuming.  This can quite easily be alleviated by software tools;  a prototype  of these is 
already in use, and further developments are underway.
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